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Cassinelli v. State of Nevada, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 62 131(Aug. 27, 2015)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: SENTENCING 
 
Summary 
 
The Court of Appeals determined that (1) the district court erred by ruling that Cassinelli 
was not eligible for alcohol treatment under NRS § 458.300(1)(d); (2) the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying Cassinelli’s request for assignment to a program of treatment; (3) 
the plea agreement was not breached and the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct at 
sentencing; (4) the district court did not err by refusing Cassinelli an opportunity to cross-
examine the victim during her impact statement at sentencing; (5) Cassinelli’s sentence was 
illegal. 
 
Background 
 
Appellant Dominic Cassinelli and the victim were romantically involved from 2006 to 
2012. The pair engaged in sadomasochistic sex during the course of their relationship. Initially it 
was consensual, but over time the sex became so violent with increased use of handcuffs and 
weapons, the victim no longer wanted to participate. The victim moved away and eventually 
reported sexual assault against Cassinelli. Prosecutors charged Cassinelli with multiple counts of 
sexual assault and child abuse. Ultimately, Cassinelli took a plea agreement and entered an 
Alford plea to coercion, a felony, (Count I), and preventing a person from testifying, a gross 
misdemeanor (Count II).2 Count I did not contain any language to reflect that coercion 
constituted domestic violence and the parties agreed Count I would not be treated as sexually 
motivated. The parties were free to argue the sentence regarding Count II. 
 
At sentencing, despite the State’s recommendation that Cassinelli undergo alcohol 
treatment for Count I, based on his eligibility under NRS § 458.300, the district court judge 
sentenced Cassinelli to 14-48 months in prison for Count I. While the judge recognized 
Cassinelli was eligible for alcohol treatment, the judge emphasized the court’s discretion in 
granting or denying Cassinelli’s request. Additionally, the judge imposed a consecutive jail term 
of 364 days for Count II. The court suspended Count II’s sentence and imposed a three-year 
probation term, to run consecutive to Count I.  
 
Cassinelli appealed and claimed the district court failed to adjudicate his motion pursuant 
to NRS § 458.290 et. seq., before imposing his sentence. In the jointly filed “Stipulation for 
Order of Remand,” the parties agreed the record did not expressly reflect that the court 
adjudicated Cassinelli’s motion for treatment before sentencing. Because the record was silent as 
to the district court’s basis for the denial, the Nevada Supreme Court approved the stipulation 
and remanded the appeal to the district court to enter an order explaining its order.3  
                                                 
1  By Mackenzie Warren. 
2  An Alford plea is a guilty plea in which a criminal defendant does not make an admission of guilt to the criminal 
act. 
3  Cassinnelli v. State, Docket N. 648811 (Order of Limited Remand, June 11, 2014). 
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On remand the district court reconsidered Cassinelli’s eligibility for alcohol treatment 
and ruled the acts underlying his guilty plea constituted domestic violence as defined in NRS § 
33.018. Even though Cassinelli pleaded guilty to coercion, and not associated with domestic 
violence, the court determined Cassinelli was not eligible to elect an alcohol treatment. The 
court’s ruling was based on NRS § 458.3000(1)(d), which says, in relevant part, a person 
convicted of a crime that is “a[n] act which constitutes domestic violence” is not eligible for 
assignment to drug or alcohol abuse treatment. Further, the court ruled even if Cassinelli were 
eligible for treatment, he was not likely to be rehabilitated and was not a good candidate for 
treatment—thus his motion was denied. This direct appeal from Cassinelli’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
The district court erred by ruling that Cassinelli was not eligible for alcohol treatment under 
NRS Chapter 458. 
 
NRS § 458.3000(1)(d) provides that a person convicted of a crime that is “a[n] act which 
constitutes domestic violence” is not eligible for assignment to drug or alcohol abuse treatment. 
Cassinelli argued he was convicted of coercion pursuant to NRS § 207.190, which would not 
preclude him from treatment. The State countered Cassinelli was ineligible because the 
underlying facts of his conviction constitute domestic violence as outlined in NRS § 
33.018(1)(c). 
 
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.4 While the plain language of 
NRS § 458.300 removes eligibility of a person convicted of a crime constituting domestic 
violence to elect for treatment, the Court found it is less clear what a judge may consider at 
sentencing to determine whether the crime constitutes domestic violence. The Court reasoned 
because subsection (d) of NRS § 458.200(1) uses the broader term “act,” in situations where the 
facts of the crime fall within domestic violence, the sentencing judge may look at the acts to 
determine eligibility for treatment. Cassinelli argued the district court judge should only consider 
the crime the defendant was convicted of to determine eligibility. Since both interpretations are 
reasonable, the Court turned to legislative history to determine intent.  
 
The legislative history made clear the bill that later precipitated NRS § 458.300 intended 
to expand the eligibility for drug and alcohol treatment programs—not limit access. However, 
the Nevada Legislature wanted to exclude defendants who pleaded guilty or were convicted of 
“battery constituting domestic violence” because these defendants had access to other programs 
aimed at targeting recidivism.5  
 
Yet, nothing in legislative history indicated the Legislature intended for the sentencing 
judge to consider whether the facts of the underlying crime consisted of domestic violence for 
                                                 
4  Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). 
5  Revises provisions governing placement of criminal offenders in programs of treatment for abuse of alcohol and 
drugs before sentencing: Hearing on A.B. 84 before the Assemb. Judiciary Comm., 68th Leg. (Nev., April 19, 1995) 
(statement of Assemb. Diane Steel, Member). 
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the purpose of determining treatment eligibility. Instead, the Court found the Legislature wanted 
eligibility to be based solely on the crime for which the defendant was charged and found guilty. 
Accordingly, the Legislature recognized the common occurrence of plea bargains, yet chose not 
to preclude plea bargains that would otherwise make an ineligible defendant eligible for a 
treatment program.  
 
Thus, in considering eligibility under NRS § 458.300(1)(d), the Court held the sentencing 
judge is limited to considering only the delineated crime that the defendant pleaded guilty to or 
was convicted of, instead of considering whether underlying acts involved constituted domestic 
violence. Cassinelli pleaded guilty to coercion and the Court determined it was clear that 
Cassinelli, the State, and district court all believed his crime did not preclude him from eligibility 
for alcohol treatment. 
 
This conclusion did not end the Court’s inquiry because the district court alternatively 
denied Cassinelli’s request based on the court’s finding that he was not likely to be rehabilitated 
by treatment or that he was not a good candidate. Either basis alone is sufficient to deny 
treatment and this Court ultimately found the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying Cassinelli’s requests on these bases.  
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cassinelli’s request for assignment to a 
program of treatment. 
 
Cassinelli claimed the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for 
treatment on the bases that he was not likely to be rehabilitated through such treatment or he was 
not a good candidate for treatment. The Court disagreed with Cassinelli’s argument that the 
court’s decision to sentence him to prison was based on prejudice of his guilty plea. The Court 
analyzed NRS § 458.320(2) and determined although the district court found that Cassinelli was 
an alcoholic, it failed to make findings whether Cassinelli was able to be rehabilitated or was not 
otherwise a good candidate.  
 
The Court considered three aspects of the statute in light of the district court’s findings. 
First, the district court reluctantly determined that Cassinelli was an alcoholic based on a facility 
evaluation and fact findings in the record, which was not an abuse of its discretion. Second, the 
district court found that Cassinelli would not likely be rehabilitated through an alcohol treatment 
program because he did not demonstrate remorse or humility and successful rehabilitation often 
depends on the defendant’s state of mind. Further, Cassinelli previously told the court he did not 
have an alcohol problem. Thus, the Court reasoned because Cassinelli did not appear to take 
accountability for his alcoholism and his criminal acts surpassed the issue of alcohol abuse, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in making the determination that Cassinelli was not 
likely to be rehabilitated from his alcohol abuse.  
 
Third, the district court determined Cassinelli was not otherwise a good candidate for 
alcohol treatment in this case because the Court agreed with the district court’s reasoning that his 
acts of abuse did not stem from alcoholism, but instead were grounded by his desire to control a 
woman by abuse, as evidenced in the facts of this case. This determination was not an abuse of 
the district court’s discretion, since the record reflected graphic pictures and an event journal that 
 4 
mirrored the victim’s testimony of abuse at the hands of Cassinelli. Although he was not charged 
or convicted with a domestic violence crime, his actions involved acts of domestic violence and 
thus, these facts weighed against sending a presumably unsuccessful candidate like Cassinelli to 
treatment.  
 
The plea agreement was not breached and the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct at 
sentencing. 
 
Cassinelli argued the prosecutor committed misconduct by pushing for a jail sentence on 
Count II, which was harsher than the punishment sentence agreed to in the plea deal. The Court 
disagreed and noted Cassinelli never objected to the prosecutor’s argument.  
 
The Court determined there was no error to warrant reversal because the State did not 
violate the terms of the plea when it exercised its right to argue at Cassineli’s sentencing.6 The 
plea agreement provided the State would not oppose alcohol treatment for Count I, if Cassinelli 
was eligible. The State upheld the deal and recommended the treatment for Count I. The plea 
agreement pertaining to Count II, however, preserved both parties’ right to argue at sentencing. 
The prosecutor argued the maximum sentence on Count II and asked for 364 days in jail. Not 
only did Cassinelli fail to object to the prosecutor’s argument, but the Court determined 
Cassinelli failed to demonstrate any error because the prosecutor’s argument on Count II did not 
undercut the sentencing recommendation, the State never breached the spirit of the plea 
agreement, and no misconduct occurred.7  
 
The district court did not err by refusing Cassinelli an opportunity to cross-examine the victim 
during her impact statement at sentencing. 
 
Although Cassinelli argued he was prevented an opportunity to cross-examine the victim, 
the record shows Cassinelli was never expressly prohibited from this cross-examination. 
Unobjected-to conduct is reviewed by the Court for plain error.8 NRS § 176.015(3)(b) governs a 
victim-impact statement and as the Court pointed out, generally a defendant is aware of the 
precise information contained in the statement and would have the opportunity for rebuttal.9 
Here, the victim’s statement was attached to the presentence investigation report, which both 
Cassinelli and the court were given exact copies well in advance of sentencing. Despite this, 
Cassinelli never objected to its content nor did he request to cross-examine the witness at 
sentencing or object to her testimony. Furthermore, Cassinelli never asserted on appeal that her 
statement went beyond the crimes involved in this case and the Court held Cassinelli failed to 
show any prejudice arose from his inability to cross-examine the victim. Thus, the Court found 
the district court did not err. 
 
The sentence was illegal. 
 
                                                 
6  Van Buskirk v. State, 102 Nev. 241, 243, 720 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1986). 
7  Sullivan v. State, 115 Nev. 383, 389, 990 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1999); see also Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 
196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008).  
8  Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 477. 
9  Busehauer v. State, 106 Nev. 890, 894, 804 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1990). 
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The district court sentenced Cassinelli to serve a prison term of 14-48 months on Count I 
and on Count II, the gross misdemeanor, sentenced him to 364 days of jail. The court then 
suspended Count II’s sentence and placed Cassinelli on probation for three years. Because the 
district court ordered Count II’s sentence to run consecutive to Count I, Cassinelli’s jail sentence 
with probation could not occur until after Cassinelli was released from prison on Count I. The 
Court agreed with Cassinelli’s argument and found the district court violated NRS § 
176A.500(1)(a), which limits probation to gross misdemeanors to three years. Because there is a 
possibility that Cassinelli would start probation after serving his maximum four-year prison 
sentence, the Court found this is clearly beyond the three-year threshold and held Cassinelli’s 
sentence on Count II is illegal.  
 
The Nevada Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in Wicker v. State.10 In Wicker, 
the defendant was convicted and sentenced for several count of robbery and rape. Years after 
serving his prison sentence, Wicker violated his probation. Although his period of probation did 
not exceed the statutory limit, his period of suspension did and the court found Wicker’s 
sentence was illegal pursuant to NRS § 176A.500(1). Since the Wicker decision the Legislature 
has changed the criminal sentencing structure, but Wicker is still good law. The Court found 
Wicker’s holding applied in Cassinelli’s case based on its premise that a sentence is illegal, at the 
time it is issued, if the probationary period inevitably exceeds the statutory maximum.11  
 
Accordingly, the Court held if any portion of a defendant’s criminal sentence is illegal at 
the time of sentencing, regardless of minimum or maximum sentence, the entire sentence is 
illegal. The Court remanded this case for the district court to impose a sentence on Count II that 
does not violate NRS § 176A.500(1)(a). The Court vacated Cassinelli’s sentence on Count II and 
remanded this case for resentencing on Count II only.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Cassinelli failed to show reversible error on the majority of his claims, though the Court 
agreed Cassinelli’s gross misdemeanor sentence for Count II is illegal under NRS § 
176A.500(1). Therefore, that sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing. The district 
court, however, did not err when it determined that despite Cassinelli’s classification as an 
alcoholic, he would nonetheless be denied assignment to treatment because it was within the 
court’s discretion. Further, the State did not breach Cassinelli’s plea agreement nor did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct. Lastly, the district court did not err by refusing Cassinelli an 
opportunity to cross-examine the victim because it was not properly raised at sentencing or in his 
appeal at issue.  
 
This case is remanded for resentencing on Count II only.  
 
                                                 
10  Wicker v. State, 111 Nev. 43, 888 P.2d 918 (1995). 
11  A majority of jurisdictions further hold that illegal sentences are void. See, e.g., State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 
339, 343 (Iowa 1995) ("[I]llegal sentences are not subject to the usual requirements of error preservation and waiver. 
An illegal sentence is one not authorized by statute; it is void." (citations omitted)); Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 
251, 256 (Term. 2007) ("A sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute is void and illegal."); Rodriguez v. 
State, 939 S.W.2d 211, 222 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) ("If the punishment is not authorized by law, the order imposing 
punishment is void."). 
